On the Freedom of the Will
PART I
Section V
Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency.
The plain and obvious meaning of thewords Freedom and Liberty, in common speech, is The power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect. as he wills. -- And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.
If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of theword Liberty, in the ordinary use of language; as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow, that in propriety ofspeech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such afaculty, power or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according to its mill, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, orthe contrary, as belonging to the very Will itself, is not tospeak good sense; if we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the original and proper signification of words.-- For the Will itself is not an Agent that has a will: the power of choosing, itself, has not a power of choosing. That whichhas the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the Libertyof doing according to his will, is the Agent who is possessed of the Will; and not the Will which he is possessed of. We say with propriety, that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly; but not that the bird's power of flying has a power arid Liberty of flying. To be free isthe property of an Agent, who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, orzealous. But these qualities are the properties of persons;and not the properties of properties.
There are two things contrary to what is called Liberty in common speech. One is constraint; otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction; which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is, his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. But that which has nowill, cannot be the subject of these things.-- I need say theless on this bead, Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth, with so great clearness, in his Essay on the HumanUnderstanding.
But one thing more I would observe concerning what isvulgarly called Liberty; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or accordingto his choice, is all that is meant by it; without takinginto the meaning of the word, any thing of the cause of thatchoice; or at all considering how the person came to havesuch a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether ithappened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Letthe person come by his choice any how, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to,the primary and common notion of freedom.
What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by Liberty, according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians, and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely differentsignification.-- These several things belong to their notionof Liberty. 1. That it consists in a self-determining powerin the Will, or a certain sovereignty the Will has over itself,and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent, in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior toits own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition, be in equilibria.3. contingence is another thingthat belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain Iconnexion with some previous ground or reason of itsexistence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so muchto consist in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever,he may be at Liberty to act according to his will.
A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a morel quality, and which canproperly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishments; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his actions bymoralinducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty.
The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth, in warming and causing it to bring forth its fruit; but it is not a moral agent: its action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral Agent: what it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment. The brute creaturesare notmoral Agents: the actions of some of themare veryprofitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful: yet seeing they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding, or with acapacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capableof beinginfluenced bymoral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful or virtuous, nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their faults or good deeds.
Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between the moral Agency of a ruler and a subject. I call it circumstantial, because it lies only in the difference of moral inducements, by which they are capable of being influenced, arising fromthe difference of circumstance. A ruler, acting in that capacity only, is not capable of being influenced by a moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings and promises,rewards and punishments, as the subject is; though both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil.And therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards his creatures, and never as a adjunct, differs in that respect from the moral Agency of created intelligent beings. God's actions, and particularly those which he exerts as a moral governor, have moral qualifications, and are morally good in the highest degree. They are most perfectly holy and righteous; and we must conceive of Him as influenced, in the highest degree, by that which, above all others, is properly a moral inducement; viz. the moral good whichHe sees insuch and such things: and therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a moral Agent, the source of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and rule of all virtue and moral good; though by reason of his being supreme over all, it is not possible He should be underthe influenceof lawor command, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments, counsels or warnings. The essential qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding to perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does verymuch consist that image of God wherein he made man, (which we read of, Gen. 1:26, 27, and chap. 9:6.) by which God distinguished man from the beasts, viz. in those faculties and principles of nature, whereby Heis capableof moral Agency. Herein very much consists the natural image of God; whereas the spiritual and moral image, wherein man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency with which he was endowed.
End of Part One
Text scanned and edited by Michael Bremmer
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